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Abstract
Protocols that solve agreement problems are essen-
tial building blocks for fault tolerant distributed sys-
tems. While many protocols have been published, lit-
tle has been done to analyze their performance, espe-
cially the performance of their fault tolerance mecha-
nisms. In this paper, we present a performance evalu-
ation methodology that can be generalized to analyze
many kinds of fault-tolerant algorithms. We use the
methodology to compare two atomic broadcast algo-
rithms with different fault tolerance mechanisms: un-
reliable failure detectors and group membership. We
evaluated the steady state latency in (1) runs with no
crashes and no suspicions, (2) runs with crashes and
(3) runs with no crashes in which correct processes are
wrongly suspected to have crashed, as well as (4) the
transient latency after a crash. We found that the two
algorithms have the same performance in Scenario 1,
and that the group membership based algorithm has
an advantage in terms of performance and resiliency
in Scenario 2, whereas the failure detector based algo-
rithm offers better performance in the other scenarios.
We discuss the implications of our results to the design
of fault tolerant distributed systems.
1 Introduction
Agreement problems — such as atomic commit-
ment, consensus, or total order broadcast — are es-
sential building blocks for fault tolerant distributed ap-
plications, including transactional and time critical ap-
plications. These agreement problems have been ex-
tensively studied in various system models, and many
protocols solving these problems have been published [1,
2], offering different levels of guarantees. However,
these protocols have mostly been analyzed from the
point of view of their safety and liveness properties,
and very little has been done to analyze their perfor-
mance. Also, most papers focus on analyzing failure
free runs, thus neglecting the performance aspects of
failure handling. In our view, the limited understand-
ing of performance aspects, in both failure free scenar-
ios and scenarios with failure handling, is an obstacle
for adopting such protocols in practice.
Unreliable failure detectors vs. group membership.
In this paper, we compare two (uniform) atomic broad-
cast algorithms, the one based on unreliable failure de-
tectors and the other on a group membership service.
In both approaches, processes are provided with esti-
mates about the set of crashed processes in the system.
The main difference is that failure detectors provide in-
consistent information about failures, whereas a group
membership service provides consistent information.
While several atomic broadcast algorithms based on
unreliable failure detectors have been described in the
literature, to the best of our knowledge, all existing
group communication systems provide an atomic broad-
cast algorithm based on group membership (see [3]
for a survey). So indirectly our study compares two
classes of techniques, one widely used in implemen-
tations (based on group membership), and the other
(based on failure detectors) not (yet) adopted in prac-
tice.
The two algorithms. For unreliable failure detec-
tors, we consider the Chandra-Toueg atomic broadcast
algorithm [4], which can tolerate f < n/2 crash fail-
ures, and requires the failure detector 3S. For group
membership we chose an algorithm that implements
total order with a mechanism close to the failure detec-
tor based algorithm, i.e., a sequencer based algorithm
(which also tolerates f < n/2 crash failures). Both
algorithms were optimized (1) for failure and suspi-
cion free runs (rather than runs with failures and suspi-
cions), (2) to minimize latency under low load (rather
than minimize the number of messages), and (3) to tol-
erate high load (rather than minimize latency at mod-
erate load).
Methodology for performance studies. The two al-
gorithms are evaluated using simulation. We model
message exchange by taking into account contention
on the network and the hosts [5]. We model failure
detectors (including the ones underlying group mem-
bership) in an abstract way, using the quality of service
(QoS) metrics proposed by Chen et al. [6]. We intro-
duce a performance metric for atomic broadcast called
latency, defined as the time that elapses between the
sending of a message m and the earliest delivery of m.
We study the atomic broadcast algorithms in several
benchmark scenarios, including scenarios with failures
and suspicions: we evaluate the steady state latency in
(1) runs with no crashes and no suspicions, (2) runs
with crashes and (3) runs with no crashes in which cor-
rect processes are wrongly suspected to have crashed,
as well as (4) the transient latency after a crash.
We believe that our methodology can be general-
ized to analyze other fault-tolerant algorithms. In fact,
beside the results of the comparison, the contribution
of this paper is the proposed methodology.
The results. The paper shows that the two algorithms
have the same performance in run with no crashes and
suspicions, and that the group membership based al-
gorithm has an advantage in terms of performance and
resiliency a long time after crashes occur. In the other
scenarios, involving wrong suspicions of correct pro-
cesses and the transient behavior after crashes, the fail-
ure detector based algorithm offers better performance.
We discuss the implications of our results to the design
of fault tolerant distributed systems.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents related work. Section 3 introduces the
system model and the atomic broadcast problem. We
describe the algorithms and their expected performance
in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the context of our
performance study, followed by our simulation model
for the network and the failure detectors in Section 6.
Our results are presented in Section 7, and the paper
concludes with a discussion in Section 8.
2 Related work
Most of the time, atomic broadcast algorithms are
evaluated using simple metrics like time complexity
(number of communication steps) and message com-
plexity (number of messages). This gives, however,
little information on the real performance of those al-
gorithms. A few papers provide a more detailed per-
formance analysis of atomic broadcast algorithms: [7]
and [8] analyze four different algorithms using discrete
event simulation; [5] uses a contention-aware metric
to compare analytically the performance of four algo-
rithms; [9, 10] analyze atomic broadcast protocols for
wireless networks, deriving assumption coverage and
other performance related metrics. However, all these
papers analyze the algorithms only in failure free runs.
This only gives a partial understanding of their quanti-
tative behavior.
Other papers analyze agreement protocols, taking
into account failure scenarios: [11] presents an ap-
proach for probabilistically verifying a synchronous
round-based consensus protocol; [12] evaluates the per-
formability of a group-oriented multicast protocol; [13]
compares the impact of different implementations of
failure detectors on a consensus algorithm (simulation
study); [14] analyzes the latency of the Chandra-Toueg
consensus algorithm. Note that in [14], as in this pa-
per, failure detectors are modeled using the quality of
service (QoS) metrics of Chen et al. [6].
3 Definitions
3.1 System model
We consider a widely accepted system model. It
consists of processes that communicate only by ex-
changing messages. The system is asynchronous, i.e.,
we make no assumptions on its timing behavior: there
are no bounds on the message transmission delays and
the relative processing speeds of processes. The net-
work is quasi-reliable: it does not lose, alter nor du-
plicate messages (messages whose sender or recipi-
ent crashes might be lost). In practice, this is easily
achieved by retransmitting lost messages. We consider
that processes only fail by crashing. Crashed processes
do not send any further messages. Process crashes are
rare, processes fail independently, and process recov-
ery is slow: both the time between crashes and time
to repair are much greater than the latency of atomic
broadcast.
The atomic broadcast algorithms in this paper (and
all the fault-tolerant algorithms in the literature) use
some form of crash detection. We call the parts of
the algorithms that implement crash detection failure
detectors. The failure detector based atomic broad-
cast algorithm uses failure detectors directly; the group
membership based atomic broadcast algorithm uses them
indirectly, through the group membership service. A
failure detector maintains a list of processes it suspects
to have crashed. It might make mistakes: it might sus-
pect correct processes and it might not immediately
suspect crashed processes.1
Note that whereas we assume that process crashes
are rare, (wrong) failure suspicions may occur frequently,
depending on the tuning of the failure detectors.
1To make sure that the atomic broadcast algorithms terminate,
we need some assumptions on the behavior of the failure detec-
tors [15]. These assumptions are rather weak: they can usually be
fulfilled in real systems by tuning implementation parameters of
the failure detectors [16].
3.2 Atomic broadcast
Atomic Broadcast is defined in terms of two prim-
itives called A-broadcast(m) and A-deliver(m), where
m is some message. Informally speaking, atomic broad-
cast guarantees that (1) if a message is A-broadcast by
a correct process, then all correct processes eventually
A-deliver it, and (2) correct processes A-deliver mes-
sages in the same order (see [17, 4] for more formal
definitions). Uniform atomic broadcast ensures these
guarantees even for faulty processes. In this paper, we
focus on uniform atomic broadcast.
4 Algorithms
This section introduces the two atomic broadcast al-
gorithms and the group membership algorithm. Then
we discuss the expected performance of the two atomic
broadcast algorithms.
4.1 Chandra-Toueg uniform atomic broadcast al-
gorithm
The Chandra-Toueg uniform atomic broadcast algo-
rithm [4] uses failure detectors directly. We shall refer
to it as the FD atomic broadcast algorithm, or simply
as the FD algorithm. A process executes A-broadcast
by sending a message to all processes.2 When a pro-
cess receives such a message, it buffers it until the de-
livery order is decided. The delivery order is decided
by a sequence of consensus numbered 1, 2, . . .. The
initial value and the decision of each consensus is a set
of message identifiers. Let msg(k) be the set of mes-
sage IDs decided by consensus #k. The messages de-
noted by msg(k) are A-delivered before the messages
denoted by msg(k + 1), and the messages denoted by
msg(k) are A-delivered according to a deterministic
function, e.g., according to the order of their IDs.
Chandra-Toueg3S consensus algorithm. For solv-
ing consensus, we use the Chandra-Toueg 3S algo-
rithm [4].3 The algorithm can tolerate f < n/2 crash
2This message is sent using reliable broadcast. We use an effi-
cient algorithm inspired by [18] that uses only one broadcast mes-
sage in most cases.
3Actually, we included some easy optimizations in the algo-
rithm.
failures. It is based on the rotating coordinator paradigm:
each process executes a sequence of asynchronous rounds
(i.e., not all processes necessarily execute the same
round at a given time t), and in each round a pro-
cess takes the role of coordinator (pi is coordinator for
rounds kn + i). The role of the coordinator is to im-
pose a decision value on all processes. If it succeeds,
the consensus algorithm terminates. It may fail if some
processes suspect the coordinator to have crashed (whether
the coordinator really crashed or not). In this case, a
new round is started. We skip the details of the exe-
cution, since they are not necessary for understanding
the paper.
Example run of the FD algorithm. Figure 1 illus-
trates an execution of the FD atomic broadcast algo-
rithm in which one single message m is A-broadcast
and no crashes and no suspicions occur. At first, m
is sent to all processes. Upon receipt, the consen-
sus algorithm starts. The coordinator sends its pro-
posal to all other processes. Each process acknowl-
edges this message. Upon receiving acks from a ma-
jority of processes (including itself), the coordinator
decides its own proposal and sends the decision (using
reliable broadcast) to all other processes. The other
processes decide upon receiving the decision message.
4.2 Fixed sequencer uniform atomic broadcast al-
gorithm
The second uniform atomic broadcast algorithm is
based on a fixed sequencer [19]. It uses a group mem-
bership service for reconfiguration in case of a crash.
We shall refer to it as the GM atomic broadcast algo-
rithm, or simply as the GM algorithm. We describe
here the uniform version of the algorithm.
In the GM algorithm, one of the processes takes
the role of sequencer. When a process A-broadcasts a
message m, it first broadcasts it to all. Upon reception,
the sequencer (1) assigns a sequence number to m,
and (2) broadcasts the sequence number to all. When
non-sequencer processes have received m and its se-
quence number, they send an acknowledgment to the
sequencer.4 The sequencer waits for acks from a ma-
4Figure 2 shows that the acknowledgments and subsequent
messages are not needed in the non-uniform version of the algo-
rithm. We come back to this issue later in the paper.
jority of processes, then delivers m and sends a mes-
sage indicating that m can be A-delivered. The other
processes A-delivermwhen they receive this message.
The execution is shown in Fig. 2. Note that the mes-
sages denoted seqnum, ack and deliver can carry sev-
eral sequence numbers. This is essential for achieving
good performance under high load. Note that the FD
algorithm has a similar “aggregation” mechanism: one
execution of the consensus algorithm can decide on the
delivery order of several messages.
When the sequencer crashes, processes need to agree
on the new sequencer. This is why we need a group
membership service: it provides a consistent view of
the group to all its members, i.e., a list of the processes
which have not crashed (informally speaking). The se-
quencer is the first process in the current view. The
group membership algorithm described below can tol-
erate f < n/2 crash failures (more in some runs) and
requires the failure detector 3S.
4.3 Group membership algorithm
A group membership service [3] maintains the view
of a group, i.e., the list of correct processes of the
group. The current view5 might change because pro-
cesses in the group might crash or exclude themselves,
and processes outside the group might join. The group
membership service guarantees that processes see the
same sequence of views (except for processes which
are excluded from the group; they miss all views af-
ter their exclusion until they join again). In addition to
maintaining the view, our group membership service
ensures View Synchrony and Same View Delivery: cor-
rect and not suspected processes deliver the same set of
messages in each view, and all deliveries of a message
m take place in the same view.
Our group membership algorithm [20] uses failure
detectors to start view changes, and relies on consen-
sus to agree on the next view. This is done as fol-
lows. A process that suspects another process starts a
view change by sending a “view change” message to
all members of the current view. As soon as a pro-
cess learns about a view change, it sends its unstable
messages6 to all others (all the other messages are sta-
5There is only one current view, since we consider a non-
partitionable or primary partition group membership service.
6Message m is stable for process p when p knows that m has
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Figure 1. Example run of the FD atomic broadcast algorithm.
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Figure 2. Example run of the GM atomic broadcast algorithm.
ble, i.e., are not needed for the view change). When
a process has received the unstable messages from all
processes it does not suspect, say P , it computes the
union U of the unstable messages received, and starts
consenus with the pair (P,U) as its initial value. Let
(P ′, U ′) be the decision of the consensus. Once a pro-
cess decides, it delivers all messages from U ′ not yet
delivered, and installs P ′ as the next view. The proto-
col for joins and explicit leaves is very similar.
State transfer. When a process joins a group, its state
needs to be synchronized with the other members of
the group. What “state” and “synchronizing” exactly
mean is application dependent. We only need to define
these terms in a limited context: in our study, the only
processes that ever join are correct processes which
have been wrongly excluded from the group. Conse-
been received by all other processes in the current view.
quently, the state of such a process p is mostly up-to-
date. For this reason, it is feasible to update the state
of p the following way: when p rejoins, it asks some
process for the messages it has missed since it was ex-
cluded. Process p delivers these messages, and then
starts to participate in the view it has joined. Note that
this only works because our atomic broadcast algo-
rithm is uniform: with non-uniform atomic broadcast,
the excluded process might have delivered messages
never seen by the others, thus having an inconsistent
state. In this case, state transfer would be more com-
plicated.
4.4 Expected performance
We now discuss, from a qualitative point of view,
the expected relative performance of the two atomic
broadcast algorithms (FD algorithm and GM algorithm).
Figures 1 and 2 show executions with no crashes
and no suspicions. In terms of the pattern of message
exchanges, the two algorithms are identical: only the
content of messages differ. Therefore we expect the
same performance from the two algorithms in failure
free and suspicion-free runs.
Let us now investigate how the algorithms slow down
when a process crashes. There are two major differ-
ences. The first is that the GM algorithm reacts to the
crash of every process, while the FD algorithm reacts
only to the crash of p1, the first coordinator. The other
difference is that the GM algorithm takes a longer time
to re-start delivering atomic broadcast messages after
a crash. This is true even if we compare the GM algo-
rithm to the worst case for the FD algorithm, i.e., when
the first coordinator p1 fails. The FD algorithm needs
to execute Round 2 of the consensus algorithm. This
additional cost is comparable to the cost of an execu-
tion with no crashes (3 communication steps, 1 mul-
ticast and about 2n unicast messages). On the other
hand, the GM algorithm initiates an expensive view
change (5 communication steps, about n multicast and
n unicast messages). Hence we expect that if the fail-
ure detectors detect the crash in the same time by the
two algorithms, the FD algorithm performs better.
Consider now the case when a correct process is
wrongly suspected. The algorithms react to a wrong
suspicion the same way as they react to a real crash.
Therefore we expect that if the failure detectors gen-
erate wrong suspicions at the same rate, the FD algo-
rithm will suffer less performance penalty.
5 Context of our performance study
5.1 Performance measures
Our main performance measure is the latency of
atomic broadcast. Latency L is defined for a single
atomic broadcast as follows. Let A-broadcast(m) oc-
cur at time t0, and A-deliver(m) on pi at time ti, for
each i = 1, . . . , n. Then latency is defined as the
time elapsed until the first A-delivery of m, i.e., L def=
(mini=1,...,n ti) − t0. In our study, we compute the
mean for L over a lot of messages and several execu-
tions.
This performance metric makes sense in practice.
Consider a service replicated for fault tolerance us-
ing active replication [21]. Clients of this service send
their requests to the server replicas using Atomic Broad-
cast. Once a request is delivered, the server replica
processes the client request, and sends back a reply.
The client waits for the first reply, and discards the
other ones (identical to the first one). If we assume that
the time to service a request is the same on all replicas,
and the time to send the response from a server to the
client is the same for all servers, then the first response
received by the client is the response sent by the server
to which the request was delivered first. Thus there is a
direct link between the response time of the replicated
server and the latency L.
Latency is always measured under a certain work-
load. We chose simple workloads: (1) all destination
processes send atomic broadcast messages at the same
constant rate, and (2) the A-broadcast events come from
a Poisson stochastic process. We call the overall rate of
atomic broadcast messages throughput, denoted by T .
In general, we determine how the latency L depends
on the throughput T .
5.2 Scenarios
We evaluate the latency of the atomic broadcast al-
gorithms in various scenarios. We now describe each
of the scenarios in detail, mentioning which parame-
ters influence latency in the scenario. Parameters that
influence latency in all scenarios are the algorithm (A),
the number of processes (n) and the throughput (T ).
Steady state of the system. We measure latency af-
ter it stabilizes (a sufficiently long time after the start of
the system or after any crashes). We distinguish three
scenarios, based on whether crashes and wrong suspi-
cions (failure detectors suspecting correct processes)
occur:
• normal-steady: No crashes and no wrong sus-
picions in the experiment.
• crash-steady: One or several crashes occur be-
fore the experiment. Beside A, T and n, an
additional parameter is the set of crashed pro-
cesses. As we assume that the crashes happened
a long time ago, all failure detectors in the sys-
tem permanently suspect all crashed processes
at this point. No wrong suspicions occur.
• suspicion-steady: No crashes, but failure detec-
tors generate wrong suspicions, which cause the
algorithms to take extra steps and thus increase
latency. Beside A, T and n, additional param-
eters include how often wrong suspicions occur
and how long they last. These parameters are
discussed in detail in Section 6.2.
It would be meaningful to combine Scenarios 2 and
3, to have both crashes and wrong suspicions. We
omitted this case, for we wanted to observe the effects
of crashes and wrong suspicions independently.
Transient state after a crash. In this scenario we
force a crash after the system reached a steady state.
After the crash, we can expect a halt or a significant
slowdown of the system for a short period. In this sce-
nario, we define latency such that it reflects the latency
of executions that are affected by the crash and thus
happen around the moment of the crash. Also, we must
take into account that not all crashes affect the system
the same way; our choice is to consider the worst case
(the crash that slows down the system most). Our def-
inition is the following:
• crash-transient: Consider that a process p crashes
at time t (no crashes and no wrong suspicions
occur, except for this crash). We have process
q (p 6= q) execute A-broadcast(m) at t. Let
L(p, q) be the mean latency of m, averaged over
a lot of executions. ThenLcrash
def
= maxp,q∈P L(p, q),
i.e., we consider the crash that affects the latency
most. In this scenario, we have one additional
parameter, describing how fast failure detectors
detect the crash (discussed in Section 6.2).
We could combine scenarios 2, 3 and 4, to include
other crashes and/or wrong suspicions. We omitted
these cases, for we wanted to observe the effects of
(i) the recent crash, (ii) old crashes and (iii) wrong
suspicions independently. Another reason is that we
expect the effect of wrong suspicions on latency to be
secondary with respect to the effect of the recent crash:
wrong suspicions usually happen on a larger timescale.
6 Simulation models
Our approach to performance evaluation is simula-
tion, which allowed for more general results as would
have been feasible to obtain with measurements in a
real system (we can use a parameter in our network
model to simulate a variety of different environments).
We used the Neko prototyping and simulation frame-
work [22] to conduct our experiments.
6.1 Modelling the execution environment
We now describe how we modeled the transmission
of messages. We use the model of [5], inspired from
simple models of Ethernet networks [23, 24]. The
key point in the model is that it accounts for resource
contention. This point is important as resource con-
tention is often a limiting factor for the performance
of distributed algorithms. Both a host and the net-
work itself can be a bottleneck. These two kinds of
resources appear in the model (see Fig. 3): the net-
work resource (shared among all processes) represents
the transmission medium, and the CPU resources (one
per process) represent the processing performed by the
network controllers and the layers of the networking
stack, during the emission and the reception of a mes-
sage (the cost of running the algorithm is neglectable).
A message m transmitted for process pi to process
pj uses the resources (i) CPUi, (ii) network, and (iii)
CPUj , in this order. Message m is put in a waiting
queue before each stage if the corresponding resource
is busy. The time spent on the network resource is our
time unit. The time spent on each CPU resource is λ
time units; the underlying assumption is that sending
and receiving a message has a roughly equal cost.
The λ parameter (0 ≤ λ) shows the relative speed of
processing a message on a host compared to transmit-
ting it over the network. Different values model dif-
ferent networking environments. We conducted exper-
iments with a variety of settings for λ. Due to lack of
space, we only present the results obtained with λ = 1
in this paper.
Crashes are modelled as follows. If a process pi
crashes at time t, no messages can pass between pi and
CPUi after t; however, the messages on CPUi and the
attached queues are still sent, even after time t. In real
systems, this corresponds to a (software) crash of the
application process (operating system process), rather
than a (hardware) crash of the host or a kernel panic.
We chose to model software crashes because they are
more frequent in most systems [25].
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Figure 3. Transmission of a message in our network model.
6.2 Modelling failure detectors
One approach to modeling a failure detector is to
use a specific failure detection algorithm and model
all its messages. However, this approach would re-
strict the generality of our study: another choice for
the algorithm would likely give different results. Also,
it is not justified to model the failure detector in so
much detail, as other components of the system, like
the execution environment, are modelled in much less
detail. We built a more abstract model instead, using
the notion of quality of service (QoS) of failure detec-
tors introduced in [6]. The authors consider the failure
detector at a process q that monitors another process p,
and identify the following three primary QoS metrics
(see Fig. 4):
Detection time TD: The time that elapses from p’s crash
to the time when q starts suspecting p perma-
nently.
Mistake recurrence time TMR: The time between two
consecutive mistakes (q wrongly suspecting p),
given that p did not crash.
Mistake duration TM : The time it takes a failure de-
tector component to correct a mistake, i.e., to
trust p again (given that p did not crash).
Not all of these metrics are equally important in
each of our scenarios (see Section 5.2). In Scenario
normal-steady, the metrics are not relevant. The same
holds in Scenario crash-steady, because we observe
the system a sufficiently long time after all crashes,
long enough to have all failure detectors to suspect the
crashed processes permanently. In Scenario suspicion-
steady no crash occurs, hence the latency of atomic
broadcast only depends on TMR and TM . In Scenario
crash-transient no wrong suspicions occur, hence TD
is the relevant metric.
In [6], the QoS metrics are random variables, de-
fined on a pair of processes. In our system, where n
processes monitor each other, we have thus n(n − 1)
failure detectors in the sense of [6], each characterised
with three random variables. In order to have an exe-
cutable model for the failure detectors, we have to de-
fine (1) how these random variables depend on each
other, and (2) how the distribution of each random
variable can be characterized. To keep our model sim-
ple, we assume that all failure detector modules are
independent and the tuples of their random variables
are identically distributed. Moreover, note that we do
not need to model how TMR and TM depend on TD, as
the two former are only relevant in Scenario suspicion-
steady, whereas TD is only relevant in Scenario crash-
transient. In our experiments, we considered various
settings for TD, and various settings for combinations
of TMR and TM . As for the distributions of the met-
rics, we took the simplest possible choices: TD is a
constant, and both TMR and TM are exponentially dis-
tributed with (different) constant parameters.
7 Results
We now present the results for all four scenarios.
Most graphs show latency vs. throughput. For easier
understanding, we set the time unit of the network sim-
trust
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p t
Figure 4. Quality of service metrics for failure detectors. Process q monitors process p.
ulation model to 1 ms. The 95% confidence interval is
shown for each point of the graph. The two algorithms
were executed with 3 and 7 processes, to tolerate 1 and
3 crashes, respectively.
Normal-steady scenario (Fig. 5). The two algorithms
have the same performance. Each curve thus shows the
latency of both algorithms.
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Figure 5. Latency vs. throughput in the
normal-steady scenario.
Crash-steady scenario (Fig. 6). For both algorithms,
the latency decreases as more processes crash. This is
due to the fact that the crashed processes do not load
the network with messages. The GM algorithm has
an additional feature that improves performance: the
sequencer waits for fewer acknowledgements, as the
group size decreases with the crashes. By comparison,
the coordinator in the FD algorithm always waits for
the same number of acknowledgments. This explains
why the GM algorithm shows slightly better perfor-
mance with the same number of crashes.
For the GM algorithm, it does not matter which pro-
cess(es) crash. For the FD algorithm, the crash of
the coordinator of Round 1 gives worse performance
than the crash of another process. However, the per-
formance penalty when the coordinator crashes is eas-
ily avoided: (1) each process tags its consensus pro-
posal with its own identifier, and (2) upon decision,
each process re-numbers all processes such that the
process with the identifier in the decision becomes the
coordinator of Round 1 in subsequent consensus exe-
cutions. This way, crashed processes will stop being
coordinators eventually, hence the steady-state latency
is the same regardless of which process(es) we forced
to crash. Moreover, the optimization incurs no cost.
Hence Fig. 6 shows the latency in runs in which non-
coordinator processes crash.
Note also that the GM algorithm has higher resiliency
on the long term if crashes occur, as the group size
decreases with the crashes. E.g., with n = 7 and 3
crashes, the GM algorithm can still tolerate one crash
after excluding the crashed processes, whereas the FD
algorithm can tolerate none.
Suspicion-steady scenario (Fig. 7, 8). The occurence
of wrong suspicions are quantified with the TMR and
TM QoS metrics of the failure detectors. As this sce-
nario involves crashes, we expect that the mistake du-
ration TM is short. In our first set of results (Fig. 7) we
hence set TM to 0, and latency is shown as a function
of TMR. We have four graphs: the left column shows
results with 3 processes, the right column those with
7; the top row shows results at a low load (10 s−1) and
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Figure 6. Latency vs. throughput in the crash-steady scenario.
the bottom row at a moderate load (300 s−1); recall
from Fig. 5 that the algorithms can take a throughput
of about 700 s−1 in the absence of suspicions.
The results show that the GM algorithm is very sen-
sitive to wrong suspicions: even at n = 3 and T =
10 s−1, it only works if TMR ≥ 50 ms, whereas the
FD algorithm still works at TMR = 10 ms; the latency
of the two algorithms is only equal at TMR ≥ 5000
ms.
In the second set of results (Fig. 8) TMR is fixed
and TM is on the x axis. We chose TMR such that the
latency of the two algorithms is close but not equal
at TM = 0: (i) TMR = 1000 ms for n = 3 and
T = 10 s−1; (ii) TMR = 10000 ms for n = 7 and
T = 10 s−1 and for n = 3 and T = 300 s−1; and (iii)
TMR = 100000 ms for n = 7 and T = 300 s−1.
The results show that the GM algorithm is sensitive
to the mistake duration TM as well, not just the mistake
recurrence time TMR.
Crash-transient scenario (Fig. 9). In this scenario,
we only present the latency after the crash of the co-
ordinator and the sequencer, respectively, as this is the
case resulting in the highest transient latency (and the
most interesting comparison). If another process is
crashed, the GM algorithm performs roughly the same,
as a view change occurs. In contrast, the FD algorithm
outperforms the GM algorithm: it performs slightly
better than in the normal-steady scenario (Fig. 5), as
fewer messages are generated, just like in the crash-
steady scenario (Fig. 6).
Figure 9 shows the latency overhead, i.e., the la-
tency minus the detection time TD, rather than the la-
tency. This results in more readable graphs; note that
the latency is always greater than the detection time
TD in this scenario, as no atomic broadcast can fin-
ish until the crash of the coordinator/sequencer is de-
tected. The latency overhead of both algorithms is
shown for n = 3 (left) and n = 7 (right) and a va-
riety of values for TD.
The results show that (1) both algorithms perform
rather well (the latency overhead of both algorithms is
only a few times higher than the latency in the normal-
steady scenario; see Fig. 5) and that (2) the FD algo-
rithm outperforms the GM algorithm in this scenario.
8 Discussion
We have investigated two uniform atomic broadcast
algorithms designed for the same system model: an
asynchronous system (with a minimal extension to al-
low us to have live solutions to the atomic broadcast
problem) and f < n/2 process crashes (the highest f
that our system model allows). We have seen that in
the absence of crashes and suspicions, the two algo-
rithms have the same performance. However, a long
time after crashes occur, the group membership based
algorithm (GM algorithm) performs slightly better and
has better resilience. In the scenario involving wrong
suspicions of correct processes and the one describing
the transient behavior after crashes, the failure detec-
tor based algorithm (FD algorithm) outperformed the
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Figure 7. Latency vs. TMR in the suspicion-steady scenario, with TM = 0.
GM algorithm. The performance differences between
the two algorithms are much greater when correct pro-
cesses are wrongly suspected.
Combined use of failure detectors and group mem-
bership. Based on our results, we advocate a com-
bined use of the two approaches [26]. Failure detectors
should be used to make failure handling more respon-
sive (in the case of a crash) and more robust (tolerating
wrong suspicions). A different failure detector, mak-
ing fewer mistakes (at the expense of slower crash de-
tection) should be used in the group membership ser-
vice, to get the long term performance and resiliency
benefits after a crash. A combined use is also desir-
able because the failure detector approach is only con-
cerned with failure handling, whereas a group mem-
bership service has a lot of essential features beside
failure handling: processes can be taken offline grace-
fully, new processes can join the group, and crashed
processes can recover and join the group. Also, group
membership can be used to garbage collect messages
in buffers when a crash occurs [27].
Generality of our results. We have chosen atomic
broadcast algorithms with a centralized communica-
tion scheme, with one process coordinating the others.
The algorithms are practical: in the absence of crashes
and suspicions, they are optimized to have small la-
tency under low load, and to work under high load as
well (messages needed to establish delivery order are
aggregated). In the future, we would like to investi-
gate algorithms with a decentralized communication
scheme (e.g., [28]) as well.
Non-uniform atomic broadcast. Our study focuses
on uniform atomic broadcast. What speedup can we
gain by dropping the uniformity requirement in either
of the approaches (of course, the application must work
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Figure 8. Latency vs. TM in the suspicion-steady scenario, with TMR fixed.
with the relaxed requirements)? The first observation
is that there is no way to transform the FD based al-
gorithm into a more efficient algorithm that is non-
uniform: the effort the algorithm must invest to reach
agreement on Total Order automatically ensures uni-
formity ([29] has a relevant proof about consensus). In
contrast, the GM based algorithm has an efficient non-
uniform variant that uses only two multicast messages
(see Fig. 2). Hence the GM based approach allows for
trading off guarantees related to failures and/or suspi-
cions for performance. Investigating this tradeoff in a
quantitative manner is a subject of future work. Also,
we would like to point out that, unlike in our study, a
state transfer to wrongly excluded processes cannot be
avoided when using the non-uniform version of the al-
gorithm, and hence one must include its cost into the
model.
Methodology for performance studies. In this pa-
per, we proposed a methodology for performance stud-
ies of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms. Its main
characteristics are the following: (1) we define repeat-
able benchmarks, i.e., scenarios specifying the work-
load, the occurence of crashes and suspicions, and the
performance measures of interest; (2) the benchmarks
include a number of scenarios with crashes and suspi-
cions; (3) we describe failure detectors using quality
of service (QoS) metrics.
The methodology allowed us to compare the two al-
gorithms easily, as only a small number of parameters
are involved. Currently, it is defined only for atomic
broadcast algorithms, but we plan to extend it to ana-
lyze other fault tolerant algorithms.
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